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CASE COMMENTS
Administrative Law-The Right to Judicial Review of
Administrative Action
P, a corporate investment broker, deposited with insured
banks, at the request of a borrower, an amount equal to the com-
pensating balance required for that borrower. The bank then issued
P a one year certificate of deposit, which, on the basis that the
obligation represented by the certificate was an insured deposit, P
sold to investors at its discounted value. D arbitrarily issued a press
release stating that such certificates would no longer qualify for
insurance. P appealed from a decision dismissing its complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. Held, reversed. P's amended
complaint charging that a corporate agency of the government caused
P substantial injury by issuance of a press release, deliberately mis-
representing federal law, for the specific purpose of destroying P's
business was sufficient to state a cause of action against the govern-
ment agency for declaratory and injunctive relief. Morton Int'l
Corp. v. FDIC, 305 F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1962).
The case poses several questions. When does a party have
the right to judicial review of a government agency's allegedly
wrongful action? What must be contained in the complaint to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of an actual "controversy?"
Will this decision inhibit the use of publicity type enforcement tech-
niques by an administrative agency?
The Administrative Procedure Act §12, 60 Stat. 244 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1958), grants the right of judicial review to
any person who has suffered a legal wrong because of any agency's
action or who has been adversely affected or aggrieved by such
action within the meaning of any relevant statute. In Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1935), the Court stated that the pro-
nouncements, policies and programs of a federal agency and its
directors could not give rise to a justiciable controversy except as
they culminate in action of a definite and concrete character con-
stituting an actual or threatened interference with the rights of the
person complaining.
Some courts have reasoned that the right to judicial review
arises only when the administrative order imposes an obligation,
that is, when it commands or prohibits. Decamp Bus Lines v.
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United States, 185 F.Supp. 366 (D.N.J. 1960). This, however,
seems to be somewhat of a minority view. Other authorities, reading
the constitutional guaranties against arbitrary and discriminatory
action into the laws creating agency powers, have held that the agency
determination may be ripe for review even though it neither com-
mands, prohibits, nor makes any direct demands on the complaining
party. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S.
407 (1942); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); 3 Davis,
Administrative Law § 21.07 (1958). These authorities appear to
be in accord with the better view that the true test in determining
the right of a party to relief is the substantiality of the present or
imminent harm which the agency determination inflicts on the com-
plaining party. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951); Zacharias v. McGrath, 105 F.Supp. 421 (D.D.C.
1952). West Virginia appears to follow this rule. In State v. Huber,
129 W. Va. 198, 40 S.E.2d 11 (1946), the court held that a judicial
question arises, upon which the court may pass judgment, if an ad-
ministrative body abuses the power given it, or exercises it in an
arbitrary or fraudulent manner.
It would seem, therefore, that the better view assures judicial
review when an agency has acted arbitrarily, abused its discretionary
power, or, when it appears that the complaining party is likely to
suffer substantial harm because of the agency ruling.
U.S. Const. art. H, § 2 limits the exercise of federal judicial
power to cases and controversies. A "controversy" must be real and
substantial, admitting of specific relief through a decree of a con-
clusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); Lizza & Sons Inc. v Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 247 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1957).
Basically, the question in each declaratory judgment case will
be whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show a
substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests
of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil
Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941). The touchstone to justiciability is injury
to a legally protected right. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, supra. Although the court in the principal case declined
to rule whether an agency press release would, in itself, give rise to
a "controversy," it seems, that because the plaintiff was given the
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relief sought it is possible for a press release to cause injuiy to a
protected right sufficient to give rise to a justiciable "controversy."
Therefore, since a complaint will not be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action, except where it appears that the plaintiff
is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proven
in support of his claim, Bowdin v. Malone, 284 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.
1960); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F.Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), it
follows that the complaint, if it alleges the presence of past or im-
minent harm to a legally protected right, will be sufficient to satisfy
the requirement of an actual "controversy" and entitle the plaintiff
to be heard.
The question of whether the decision in the principal case will
affect the publicity type enforcement techniques of administrative
agencies can be resolved by a consideration of the right of an agency
to perform its duties and the public's interest in the administration
of the law as against an individual's right to conduct his business
free from government interference.
It has been held that the Administrative Procedure Act has not
changed the principle that one must have suffered a legal wrong in
order to have standing to challenge programs administered by the
government. Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1962).
It is also maintained that administrative agencies should be free to
fashion their own rules of procedure and pursue methods of inquiry
capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.
Cella v. United States, 208 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1953). The inter-
ference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of
the executive department of the government would be productive of
"mischief" and such a power was never intended to be given them.
Duba v. Schuetzle, supra. To invoke the power of the court one
must be able to show that he has sustained or is in immediate danger
of sustaining some direct injury to a particular right of his own as
the result of the promulgation of an agency rule, and not merely
that he suffers in some indefinite way with people generally. Perkins
v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1922).
However, on the other hand, it appears to be elementary law
that an order of an agency which adjudicates rights or directs must
be based on a hearing. Kukatush Mining Co. v. SEC, 198 F.Supp.
508 (D.D.C. 1961); Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F.Supp.
376 (D.D.C. 1957). Also, an administrative order cannot be upheld
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unless the grounds upon which the agency acted, in exercising its
power, were those upon which its action could be sustained. Baudin
v. Dulles 235, F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956). It has been decided that
if the agency's action is arbitrary the injured party win have the
right to judicial review. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, supra; Friend v. Lee, 221 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
It seems, therefore, that the decision of the principal case does
not vary from the rules already established concerning agency action.
This case will inhibit the use of publicity type enforcement techniques
if such techniques are used in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
On the other hand, if the press release is issued in a valid exercise
of the agency's authority and is in compliance with the law the
decision of the case will not affect it, for the courts will not interfere
in the valid exercise of an agency's power.
The courts in these situations are placed in a delicate position,
for they must not only promote the public's interest in the adminis-
tration of the law but also safeguard the constitutional right of each
individual. But, as the cases indicate, the rights of the individual
rise higher than the preservation of enforcement techniques employed
by administrative agencies.
Thomas Franklin McCoy
Conflict of Laws-Wrongful Death Measure of Damages--
Substantive or Procedural?
The intestate, a passenger of D's common carrier aircraft, was
killed in a crash in Massachusetts, the state of D's incorporation. P,
as administratrix of her husband's estate, brought suit in federal
district court, in New York, on diversity of citizenship. On appeal,
only the cause of action based on the Massachusetts wrongful death
act was considered. The district court applied the Massachusetts
statute, but refused to apply the 15,000 dollar limitation, as being
contrary to the public policy of New York. The circuit court
reversed. Upon rehearing, the court, sitting en bane, held, reversed
and affirmed the district court. If the foreign law normally applicable
violates the strongest moral convictions or appears profoundly unjust
at the forum, neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor the Due
Process Clause requires that the law be applied. Pearson v. North-
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